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Abstract  
The paper provides a critical perspective on recent contributions to the economics literature, and 
associated philosophical arguments, that downplay negative effects of skilled migration on 
developing countries. The assertion that such migration incentivizes investment in human capital is 
shown to rely on shaky theoretical foundations and weak empirical evidence. The associated 
economic literature suggesting a net positive effect of brain drain is at odds with literatures on the 
positive effects of human capital and education on economic growth. The manner in which net 
effects are determined also demonstrates that such contributions are utilitarian in nature. 
Identifying those who are the worst affected by brain drain, as well as the possible decision of a 
citizen placed behind the veil of ignorance, supports the view that opposing barriers to brain drain is 
inconsistent with a Rawlsian social welfare function. The undermining of institutions by skilled 
emigration is a fundamental consideration neglected by the economics literature without 
justification and, again, contradicts literatures on growth and institutions within economics. The 
economic theory of education can also be shown to support the view that depriving governments of 
the power to limit migration undermines states' ability to resolve market failures.  A number of 
other issues are identified that deserve greater consideration, including reflexivity in research on 
brain drain, the political economy of skilled migration and the philosophical status of nation-states. 
Despite unreliable econometric evidence, there is sufficient basis and justification to act. The paper 
concludes by briefly sketching possible actions under different degrees of international cooperation.  
  
Economic dynamics, broadly conceived, are fundamental to the issue of brain drain. The decision to 
migrate is typically informed and enabled by labour market characteristics of the individual migrant 
and the countries in question. Furthermore, as noted in various places by Brock and Blake (2015), 
many of the broader societal consequences of interest are economic in nature. And the study of 
economics can provide useful insights into the merits and limitations of possible interventions to 
limit brain drain and mitigate its undesirable consequences.  
Nevertheless, the economics literature needs to be approached cautiously. Since at least the essay 
by Lionel Robbins (Robbins 1932), there has been broad recognition among economists that in 
principle it is important to separate, or at least distinguish, normative from positive considerations in 
economic analysis.
1
 In practice, however, this is too-often accomplished by simply suppressing 
explicit statement of normative positions which nevertheless continue to inform theoretical and 
empirical work. The result is potentially dangerous: normatively-influenced analysis presented as 
objective, positive analysis.  
Furthermore, economists have a bad habit of mystifying obvious conclusions that they find 
unpalatable, while asserting as obvious conclusions that are otherwise counterintuitive. In the 
subsequent discussion I will argue that such problems can also be found in the economic literature 
on brain drain and examine the implications for some of the issues discussed by Brock and Blake 
(2015). Given such concerns, one should be cautious – as Brock (2015, 266-267) notes – in placing 
too much weight on short-term ‘trends’ in various economic literatures. More specifically, I argue 
that the conclusions of empirical work should be interpreted with a significant degree of skepticism.  
Despite the centrality of economic questions, it is important that more explicit attention is given to 
the normative issues raised by the brain drain. The contributions by Brock and Blake are extremely 
valuable in this regard. The position adopted by Blake, that skilled migration should not be 
restricted, is consistent with the underlying normative position of the recent economics literature. I 
show, however, that the empirical case made by this literature rests primarily on a utilitarian 
foundation. A Rawlsian approach to social welfare, which Blake explicitly favours, undermines the 
normative conclusions reached by economists claiming that there is a ‘brain gain’ or ‘beneficial brain 
drain’. Furthermore, two approaches to justice using the core of the original contribution by Rawls 
(1971) both militate against acceptance of brain drain. 
Beyond this, I suggest that Brock’s emphasis on institutional harms is profoundly important and 
highlights a glaring omission in the economic brain drain literature. Finally, I suggest that certain 
philosophical objections by Blake are inconsistent with our knowledge of certain economic 
relationships, such as the role of credit markets in resolving market failures in education. I conclude 
with some brief thoughts on the philosophical status of nation-states, the case for action in the face 
of unreliable evidence and the need for greater reflexivity in debates about brain drain. 
I should briefly state my position on some important issues not addressed below. First, I do not 
necessarily share Brock and Blake’s commitment to a broad, rhetorical notion of liberalism and 
wonder about the extent of its importance for the various arguments made. Nevertheless, I do agree 
with many of the specific liberal principles both authors invoke. Notably: in what follows I do not 
intend to endorse the prevention of migration from objectively inhumane conditions (for the 
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 See Colander and Su (2015) for a history which places the actual origins of the distinction prior to Robbins, 
but in a manner which is otherwise consistent with the stance of the present paper regarding the importance 
of this for claims about economic theory and evidence. 
migrant) or to escape illegitimate or oppressive governments.
2
 And I agree with Blake (2015) that 
due consideration should be given to the actual intent of governments in restricting movement, as 
well as their ability to effectively and fairly implement any such restrictions without unintended 
consequences. Lastly, I agree that much more responsibility can, and should, be assigned to 
developed country governments and citizens in two respects: not encouraging harmful, selective 
migration through policy mechanisms or underinvestment in skills; compensating developing 
countries for the any losses that are incurred. 
1.  LIMITATIONS AND BIASES IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS   
To sharpen concerns about the recent economics literature, it is useful to focus on specific example. 
One of the most influential arguments to enter the brain drain debate in recent decades is that brain 
drain has positive effects because of the incentive created for human capital investment (Mountford 
1997, Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz 1998). In some respects this is a very typical argument for 
an economist. Indeed, some mainstream economists pride themselves on producing arguments that 
contradict popular ‘anti-market’ sentiment, are counterintuitive and yet can be premised on some 
formulation of individual incentives and rational choice. 
Investment in human capital has for some time been modeled by economists as a utility 
maximization process, simplified to maximization of the net present value of future income. In this 
standard framework – see for instance Kapur and McHalee (2005, 76-78) – the possibility of 
migration to countries that pay higher wages (in real terms) for a given skill necessarily raises the net 
present value of the investment. This possibility has been taken seriously enough that some authors 
have examined whether increasing prospects of migration could be used as a less costly alternative 
to public education subsidies (Docquier, Faye and Pestieau 2008). 
Conceptual problems 
The problem, which is not unique to this specific hypothesis, is that it does not follow that 
individuals would not invest in the relevant skills if migration were impossible. The reason is that the 
local skill premium may well be adequate to induce the same level of investment. In a world in which 
possible education investments are finite and based on career choices, the possibility of migration 
may only raise investment in a given skill because the relative wage is different in the developed 
country. 
This can be illustrated using a two-career example. Assume that an individual can either train to be a 
doctor, or not get education and be a street sweeper. The local wage for a doctor is wD and for street 
sweeper wS, such that Y(wD) - CD > Y(wS) - CS. Where Y(w) is the net present value of the future 
income stream and C is similarly the net present cost of investing in the skills for a given career. 
Assume foreign country wages are three-times higher across the board and designate them 
accordingly as w’D = 3wD and w’S=3wS. Then the possibility of migration makes no difference to the 
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 In some instances I do worry that even these distinctions are not as clear as is sometimes suggested. Brock, 
for example, suggests that Uganda would qualify as one such state because of its bigoted attitude to sexual 
orientation (Brock 2015, 86). While I agree that the government’s stance is abhorrent, it is not clear to me why 
it follows that there should be no restrictions on migration by individuals who do not suffer directly from such 
discrimination. If we cast the liberal net suitably wide, we may find no government that satisfies strict 
interpretations of every liberal principle; consider for instance developed countries’ surveillance of electronic 
communication. Why the poorest and most oppressed should therefore suffer the unmitigated negative 
consequences of brain drain is unclear. 
decision to invest in becoming a doctor: it always makes sense to become a doctor if one can, 
regardless of whether migration is possible. 
In fact, the most notable effect migration could have on the human capital decision in this set-up is 
to cause individuals to become developed country street sweepers instead of developing country 
doctors (if w’S > wD). The potential for brain waste in the simplified model is therefore more plausible 
than brain gain. Such concerns have been noted in other literatures in relation to geriatric care in 
developed countries leading to undesirable distortions in medical skills acquisition in developing 
countries. However, most recent contributions to the economics literature downplay such concerns 
even when there is some evidence to support them (Gibson and McKenzie 2012). 
In theory, a beneficial effect could occur in the above model if the local net benefit of a given career 
is negative. If training as a doctor was more costly than the future local returns then prospective 
higher international wages could lead to more individuals investing in the costlier skill. Empirically 
this seems less plausible than the first implication above. It also rests to some extent on well-
functioning credit markets – a point returned to below. 
The outcome above is not because of a more simplified model, but rather that the standard 
approach in economics assumes individual human capital investment to be increasing without limit 
in proportion to future pecuniary returns. While a convenient modeling assumption, it results in a 
potentially misleading conclusion. There may, therefore, be some merit to returning to the more 
nuanced analysis originally conducted by Bhagwati and Hamada (1974). Those authors consider a 
range of scenarios in terms of the effect of higher international wages on domestic labour markets 
and migration. Included among those is the possibility that higher international wages cause 
migration and a rise in domestic wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. In Bhagwati and 
Hamada’s model this leads to higher unemployment. One may reasonably presume that it would 
also reduce a government’s spending power because of having to pay more for the same skills. 
Furthermore, if migration is largely limited to skilled labour, migration may increase (already high) 
income inequality, which is now increasingly recognized as contributing to social instability and 
lower economic growth. 
Empirical evidence? 
What of the apparent empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that migration prospects induce 
greater investment in human capital? By the current standards of academic economics regarding 
identification of causal relationships, the research question is unanswerable with the data and 
methods available. Doing so would require demonstrating a causal link between an unmeasured 
variable (the perceived prospect of migration) and human capital investment decisions (of which we 
typically only observe outcomes) that is not confounded by other observed and unobserved 
variables. The inability to do this has not, unfortunately, prevented economists from making fairly 
definitive statements in this regard.
3
  
The point may be illustrated by analysis of two highly-cited contributions. The first is a series of 
macroeconomic analyses of the supposed human capital benefit of skilled migration. The second is a 
microeconomic study which relies on the preceding macroeconomic findings, but otherwise focuses 
on benefits to migrant themselves.  
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 Elsewhere I argue that disregard by economists for the limitations of their methods renders large swathes of 
the discipline pseudoscientific. 
Macroeconomic analysis of brain drain, growth and human capital investment 
The first of the macroeconomic analyses is Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), who are cited by 
many authors as having shown that skilled migration has a positive effect on human capital 
investment. This is misleading both as a representation of the original paper and the limitations of 
the methods employed. The original paper more correctly states: “we find that the possibility of a 
[beneficial brain drain] could be more than a theoretical curiosity”. The authors’ modesty is well-
founded. The key equation estimated in the paper does not hold-up to even the weaker 
econometrics standards for causal identification of two decades ago.
4
 Furthermore, the data used 
does not allow for measurement of skilled migration, only gross migration. A full assessment of the 
econometric limitations requires a separate analysis; nevertheless, it is worth considering a few of 
these. 
 The dataset used by the original empirical study in Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) is a single 
cross-section of 37 countries, so the information on growth, migration and education levels are 
simultaneous, or overlapping. Therefore it implausibly attempts to identify a dynamic process – in 
which individuals’ observe returns to education to other migrants and then invest in their own – 
using static data.
5
 Furthermore, the supposed ‘positive relationship’ that the authors find between 
migration and human capital investment is better interpreted as: ‘there is a significant conditional 
correlation across developing countries between migration levels and education levels’. 
Interpretation of this as representing a causal link between migration and human capital investment 
is entirely dependent on the paper’s theoretical model, the simplifying assumptions and functional 
form of which have tenuous empirical justification. Finally, the authors use a dubious method of 
allowing for a possible non-linearity in the relationship studied and fail – contrary to good practice – 
to state whether their results are robust to this assumption. Putting that to one side, it is even more 
notable that they fail to describe and explain why their results in fact do imply a negative effect of 
migration on education for countries that have a “GDP per capita more than 15% of the average GDP 
per capita in G7 countries”.
6
 
Such problems and limitations are not uncommon in the applied economics literature, to the extent 
that some economists may even feel that the above criticisms are unfair. Specifically, it is standard 
practice to make weak empirical work on an interesting topic more publishable through prior 
development of a sophisticated-looking theoretical model – even when the estimated empirical 
model bears only superficial resemblance to the theoretically-derived results. Whether this is 
inherently wrong from an academic perspective may be a moot point for some, but it clearly is 
problematic if such ‘evidence’ is used to bolster policy positions on critical social issues. 
Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008, 2010) subsequently present an expanded analysis and defend 
the ‘robustness’ of their previous findings. The authors use a larger dataset and instrumental 
variables to bolster their claims of a causal effect. The approach to the problem of dynamics is now 
marginally more plausible, with the dependent variable being growth in population-wide 
educational attainment from 1990 to 2000 which is ‘explained’ by skilled migration propensities in 
1990. This time there is no non-linear effect; the interaction term which previously produced the 
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 The obvious question that arises is: why is such work published? Some proposed explanations are provided 
elsewhere. 
5
 Alternatively, it assumes – as implausibly – that individuals in developing countries have perfect information 
about returns to skills in developed countries. 
6
 For some reason the authors attempt to estimate a non-linearity by creating a dummy variable representing 
those developing countries that have a GDP per capita above this threshold and those that have GDP per 
capita below it. 
primary result in Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001) is now statistically insignificant. Instead it is 
the individual migration variable that alone produces the positive effect. Furthermore, the 
conceptual significance of the interaction term is now ascribed to possible credit market limitations 
in poor countries, which were not mentioned at all in the 2001 paper. The interaction variable 
continues to be estimated in the 2010 paper, though it is removed from the primary specification, 
and is now again statistically insignificant. 
None of the above papers consider the possible implications of individuals migrating to obtain 
further education, which is unfortunate as this is possibly the most obvious potential confounding 
factor.
7
 This appears to be, in part, because there is no data (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2010, 
149). To illustrate the problem, consider another simple example. A developing country has a stable 
adult working population of 100, where 10 of those individuals have higher education – so the stock 
of human capital in 1989 by that measure is 0.1. Furthermore, at that point there is no migration. 
What would happen if a once-off opportunity arises in 1990, say due to a government subsidy 
scheme, for 10 individuals to migrate for higher education?
8
 Assume only 2 of those return. The 
stock of human capital is then observed to increase by 20% over the relevant period. And this will be 
associated with a migration probability of 0.1. Whereas in an identical country where the 
government does not introduce such a scheme, the migration probability is zero and the change in 
human capital stock is zero. A ‘cross-country regression’ with the form estimated by Beine, Docquier 
and Rapoport (2001)would then find a positive association between the prospect of migration and 
growth in human capital. Yet in our model that has nothing to do with an incentive effect and 
everything to do with a government scheme to improve its human capital stock. To add insult to 
econometric injury, most of the benefit of the investment (80%) accrues to countries from which the 
migrants do not return.    
The authors also pay no serious attention to factors, such as various forces of globalisation, that may 
create other (possibly spurious) connections between migration propensities and subsequent 
educational attainment. In principle such confounding could be resolved by the use of instrumental 
variables, but in practice the instruments used by the authors (total population, and existing number 
of emigrants in the OECD in 1990) are hardly convincing by the standards of the modern 
microeconometrics literature.  The apparent consistency of these results across various 
unconvincing functional forms and empirical measures of migration prospects (Beine, Docquier and 
Rapoport 2010) certainly raises interesting epistemological questions, but arguably is not reassuring 
for policy purposes. 
Microeconomic analysis of the gains to migrants 
A second example of problematic empirical work, which is microeconomic rather than 
macroeconomic in nature, is Gibson and McKenzie (2012).
9
 These authors note that the literature 
emphasizing negative effects of brain drain does not pay enough attention to the benefits to 
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 Even if it does not explain the majority of skilled emigration. 
8
 The example can easily be adapted to match the actual variables used by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 
(2008, 2010). Interestingly, Gibson and McKenzie (2012, 353) note that “we do see return migrants 
accumulating additional human capital relative to non-migrants”, which is suggestive. Relatedly, the latter 
authors use migrant responses indicating that they would have obtained less education if they had not 
migrated as evidence that migration causes human capital accumulation domestically, but such responses are 
entirely consistent with the toy model of migration-for-education discussed in the main text. 
9
 Another example would be Easterly and Nyarko (2008), where the authors state that: “Although some of our 
exercises are reliant on special assumptions and shaky data that require further investigation, we conclude 
based on what we can know in this paper that the brain drain is on balance good for Africa.” 
migrants themselves. This is a good and valid point. The authors then proceed to attempt an 
estimate of these benefits by surveying individuals who were historically among their countries’ top 
high school achievers across five countries. The paper provides some interesting evidence on income 
gains to migrants (the focus of the paper), remittances, return migration and attempted measures of 
networks and knowledge transfer.
10
  
There are two main problems. First, the paper’s back-of-the-envelope estimates of fiscal costs make 
dubious assumptions which serve to reduce the net fiscal costs of skilled emigration to source 
countries. Second, despite using a very niche sample, not having any new evidence of their own on 
negative effects and acknowledging that such effects are hard to measure, the authors nevertheless 
see fit to speculate about the likely magnitude of these effects.
11
 On the basis of such speculation, 
they subsequently come to the remarkable conclusion that: 
The measured benefits greatly exceed the measured costs, suggesting that on balance high-skilled 
migration is improving the living standards of individuals born in countries with high levels of 
emigration. 
 I briefly note some of the problematic assumptions in the paper’s fiscal cost estimates.  
First, the authors disregard the benefits migrants have received from government education 
subsidies on the basis that these are ‘sunk costs’. In one fell swoop they omit the substantial cost of 
lost public investment in individuals for the broader social good. In doing so, as I detail further 
below, they summarily dismiss established positions in economics regarding the basis and merit of 
government expenditure on education. 
Second, the authors only calculate the counterfactual amount of income and sales tax individuals 
would pay directly and not the total taxation the state would receive due to the effect of these 
individuals on the economy. The total effect would include the ‘multiplier effect’ of their 
consumption and investment expenditure, as well as any fiscal benefits from higher growth.
12
  
A third issue relates to the authors’ assumption that migration saves governments money by virtue 
of not having to pay for public services for those who have migrated. The calculation employed 
assumes that skilled migrants would have received the same fiscal benefit as the average citizen. 
This is patently false in many developing countries with successful systems of redistribution and 
cross-subsidisation.  
In South Africa, for instance, a thorough recent study has shown that government expenditure on 
public services significantly reduces inequality (Inchauste, et al. 2015). This is as one would hope, 
since the system is designed to be ‘progressive’ – in a technical and normative sense – such that 
individuals with higher ability make a greater contribution. The institutional significance of user 
charges and such cross-subsidisation is entirely neglected in the above analysis. Suffice to say that 
the departure of those with higher ability to pay can collapse otherwise sustainable public systems 
based on cross-subsidisation. 
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 It is worth noting that much of the ‘data’ collected by the authors consists of individual self-reports, which 
are typically treated with extreme skepticism in the econometric literature. 
11
 “The one key effect we cannot measure is the uncompensated externalities of high human capital. Such 
externalities have been at the heart of brain drain debate since the beginning.” (Gibson and McKenzie 2012, 
365-366) 
12
 The latter omission is of course partly because the authors’ refuse to accept that skills may have a positive 
effect on growth. 
Additional observations 
The above analyses share two other characteristics that are worth noting. First, they neglect to 
consider the implications of a lag between the emigration of skilled citizens and the benefits that 
may accrue at some point in the future. An institutional perspective, advocated by Brock and 
discussed further below, suggests that the interim harms could be both significant and hard to 
subsequently counteract. 
Secondly, from a philosophical perspective it is important to consider how the above papers 
estimate net effects. In all cases authors calculate, or argue, in a way which weights a dollar equally 
regardless of which citizen receives it. This is most explicit in Gibson and McKenzie (2012) who focus 
on the monetary benefit to migrants, arguing that offsets any harms to others. That approach is 
clearly utilitarian, which appears at odds with the fact that Blake takes a comparable stance in some 
respects but states that his position is Rawlsian. That tension is addressed further below. 
It is certainly desirable that researchers continue to advance our ability to obtain evidence on the 
effects of skilled migration. However, until both data and methods are significantly improved, 
empirical analysis should be treated with caution and associated policy claims with extreme 
skepticism. This raises an important philosophical question: if econometric methods do not suffice to 
convincingly address this question, are we thereby prevented from adopting a preliminary position 
and acting accordingly? The conclusion of the paper suggests not. 
2.  ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE, GROWTH AND INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTS 
Besides the implicit assumption of a utilitarian welfare function, there is a second methodological 
concern regarding claims about the net effects of skilled migration. I suggest that, logically, 
approximation of net effects should proceed as follows. First, establish the effect on economic 
growth rates. Second, establish microeconomic effects on the society as a whole. Third, establish the 
effects on migrants themselves. This is logical because economic data and theorising support a 
preliminary hypothesis that the order of magnitude of these effects, if they exist, diminishes from 
the first to the third. Gibson and McKenzie (2012) explicitly take the opposite view. 
Still debating whether skills matter for growth… 
There is a remarkable level of inconsistency within economics on the relationship between economic 
growth and cognitive abilities, or education levels, of citizens. Theories of endogenous growth imply 
that human capital has a significant, positive effect on economic growth. (Lucas 1988, Romer 1990).  
Early empirical studies using cross-country growth regressions supported this with findings of a 
strong, significant relationship between education and growth (Barro 1991).  
However, Gibson and McKenzie (2012) cite subsequent work by Pritchett (2001) and Bils and Klenow 
(2000) as a basis for questioning whether schooling actually affects growth. It is largely on the basis 
of those contributions, along with a smorgasbord of barely-relevant microeconomic studies, that 
they assert growth and society-wide effects to be of second order relative to benefits to migrants 
themselves. 
However, recent research in the economics of education literature argues that when measured 
appropriately both education quantity and quality, which represent a dimension of human capital, 
have significant positive effects on growth: 
The simple conclusion from the combined evidence is that differences in cognitive skills lead to 
economically significant differences in economic growth.  (Hanushek and Woessmann 2012) 
Those authors find that the positive effect on growth of the quality of education is larger for low-
income countries and suggest that a standard deviation increase in the cognitive skills of a country’s 
workforce is associated with two percentage points higher annual growth in GDP (Hanushek and 
Woessmann 2012, 300). 
Given such findings, a reasonable null hypothesis might be that the negative effects of skilled 
emigration on growth will swamp any positive microeconomic or individual effects. But as with the 
work by Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001, 2008, 2010) it is true that there are serious – perhaps 
insurmountable – challenges to establishing causal relationships of this kind at the macroeconomic 
level. These limitations are used by authors who emphasise the positive effects of skilled emigration 
to downplay such findings. Although preceding the contributed cited above, Clemens (2011) argues 
that “[the broader benefits of education] have proven difficult to observe, their theoretical basis 
remains unclear, and their use to justify policy remains shaky” (Clemens 2011, 90). 
The problem here is two-fold. First, as discussed above in relation to Gibson and McKenzie (2012), 
the current macroeconometric and microeconometric evidence of positive effects of skilled 
emigration for host countries is also shaky and does not satisfy the current requirements for causal 
identification in that literature. Yet such limitations are papered-over by the same authors who 
dismiss the positive effect of education on growth. Second, it is a logical fallacy to assert that 
because a causal relationship cannot be accurately quantified that it is therefore insignificant.  
Once again the question arises as to whether any position can be adopted in the face of such 
uncertainty in the empirical evidence. To précis the paper’s conclusion, I would suggest that the two 
uncertainties described in this and the preceding section are not at all comparable. The one 
hypothesised relationship arises from the contortions of empirically-unfounded theoretical models. 
The other arises from our observation of almost every facet of modern economic activity. To equate 
the two is to commit a grave fallacy of logic. 
Institutions and neglected microeconomic effects 
Researchers focusing on possible microeconomic benefits of brain drain (Gibson and McKenzie 2011, 
Clemens 2011, Gibson and McKenzie 2012, Easterly and Nyarko 2008) give the impression, whether 
intentionally or not, that the microeconomic harms are negligible. Certainly, none of these authors 
give any serious consideration to microeconomic harms besides direct fiscal measures. A notable 
exception in the broad economics literature are the discussions in Kapur and McHale (2005, 5-6 and 
96-102). 
Perhaps the most notable omission, the importance of which is raised repeatedly by Brock (2015), is 
the possible harmful effect on developing country institutions. There is little doubt that in the last 
few decades the economics literature has moved toward the position that ‘institutions matter’.
13
 As 
Brock puts it, “effective states are undeniably important for beneficial development” (Brock 2015, 
28).  
The consequences for institutions may have been largely neglected in the economics of brain drain 
literature for two now-familiar reasons. First, it would appear that a number of the authors already-
                                                            
13
 This is reflected to some extent in the awarding of the Nobel Memorial Prize for Economics to the likes of 
Douglass North (1993) and later Oliver Williamson and Elinor Ostrom (2009). 
cited have the explicit intention of showing that brain drain is not such a bad thing. It should 
therefore be of little surprise that certain negative consequences fall by the way side. Second, 
despite the now extensive economics literature on institutions at both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic level, the causal relationship of interest here is hard to both define and measure. In 
modern economics, what cannot be econometrically estimated is often simply ignored.  
Nevertheless, it is fairly straightforward to see how the likelihood of institutional harms substantially 
undermines many of the positive claims made about skilled emigration. A notable point in relation to 
the kinds of microeconomic studies mentioned above (Easterly and Nyarko 2008, Gibson and 
McKenzie 2012), is that migrants may have greater skills than their observable characteristics 
suggest. For example, merely looking at level of tertiary education attained does not give an 
accurate picture of the distribution of cognitive and other skills.  
Since developed country labour markets for high-skilled individuals are more competitive, and 
developed countries deliberately attract the highest-calibre migrants, a reasonable null hypothesis is 
that emigrants have greater skills and talent than non-emigrants with observably identical 
characteristics.
14
 (Note that ‘observable’ here is in reference to the usual datasets available to 
economists). In that case, the harms caused by such individuals’ departure are likely to be 
understated in empirical work.
15
  
Everyday experience certainly suggests that a critical mass of competent and principled individuals 
can make a large difference to many types of institutions. This knowledge should not be dismissed 
merely because it does not come from an estimated econometric equation. To my knowledge, there 
is little work in the current economics literature on the role of highly-skilled and highly-motivated 
individuals in institutional development, performance and sustainability. However, a relevant 
example does exist in the education literature. Hanushek (2011) summarises decades of influential 
work, arguing that school teachers near the top of the distribution of teacher ability and/or 
effectiveness have a huge effect on student educational and economic outcomes.
16
 It follows that if 
skilled migration ‘creams-off’ the top teachers in developing country school systems that the lost 
benefits could be substantial . Ex ante, it is hard to see why similar results would not be found for 
nurses, doctors or various other categories of skilled workers. And as a matter of consistency within 
the discipline of economics, it is puzzling that authors endorsing the existence of a beneficial brain 
drain fail to cite such contributions.  
Given the above arguments from the core of the economics literature – on institutions, selection 
effects and effects of teacher quality – it seems entirely plausible, if we are to engage in similar 
conjecture, that these negative effects could easily swamp the gains to individual migrants. 
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 Such ‘selection’ behaviour is at the heart of many developments in economics and econometrics over the 
last few decades. Despite that, Gibson and McKenzie (2012) summarily dismiss the possibility – with reference 
to a similar point made by Kapur and McHale (2005, 97) – due to the absence of ‘empirical evidence’. 
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 I leave aside, here, the possible correlation between moral determination to make a contribution to building 
one’s country and individuals’ skills; to the extent this exists it could off-set some of the negative selection 
effects referred to in the main text. 
16
 While I have a number of qualms with aspects of Hanushek’s methodology and some of his policy 
conclusions (‘fire the bottom 20% of teachers’), I believe that the conclusions referred to may be broadly 
correct. 
3.  EDUCATION EXTERNALITIES,  CONTRACTING AND CREDIT MARKETS 
In Chapter 4 Brock considers a variety of possible interventions by governments to limit either skilled 
emigration or the negative consequences for the remaining citizens of developing countries. Blake 
objects to even the weakest of these proposals on ostensibly liberal grounds. The next section 
addresses selected philosophical matters. Here I present economic reasoning relating to education 
investment, which calls into question the basis for some of Blake’s objections. 
The traditional justification in neoclassical economics for government provision, or subsidisation, of 
education is that education has positive externalities for other citizens. These externalities could 
include improved civic engagement, greater productivity and faster economic growth.
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Furthermore, that another form of market failure can arise where imperfect, or non-existent, credit 
markets prevent less wealthy individuals from investing optimally in their own education. The idea is 
that if future returns to education exceed current cost it should, in theory, be possible to borrow 
against those future returns to finance one’s education.  
As Brock notes throughout, the departure of skilled citizens may mean that the returns to public 
investment in education are never realised. Blake argues, in parallel to Gibson and McKenzie (2012) 
cited above, that requiring graduates to remain, or to repay the costs of their education, is either 
coercive or constitutes an unfair distribution of responsibility. Regardless of whether those 
arguments are philosophically convincing, I suggest that whatever philosophical merits they may 
have are undermined by economic considerations.
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Arguably the major problem with Blake’s position is a failure to appreciate the implications of 
rejecting the enforceability of, implicit or explicit, social contracts. He appears to accept that 
prospective students may take a loan from a private bank in order to finance their education, and 
then be required to repay this – including, presumably, with the coercive assistance of institutions of 
state. But similar agreements entered into with government, either implicitly or explicitly, cannot be 
enforced on the grounds of coercion.  
I find the juxtaposition between private and public contracts bizarre and unconvincing. However, the 
clearest problem with this view is that if government education subsidies are driven by resolving 
market failures, then strictly speaking the inability to enforce such arrangements should lead 
governments to stop providing such subsidies. If governments have scarce resources there is little 
justification for channelling them to a small minority of individuals who subsequently retain all the 
benefits thereof. Yet given the apparent private and public returns to education, this would reduce 
both social welfare and the welfare of individuals who would otherwise have received this 
education. 
Relatedly, allowing unchecked migration creates perverse incentives. Consider the case of public 
loan schemes for higher education, in which beneficiaries are expected to repay their loans if their 
subsequent income exceeds a threshold. Under Blake’s approach one of two outcomes would arise. 
Either migrants would be allowed to leave without repaying their debts – despite apparently earning 
vastly higher incomes (Gibson and McKenzie 2012) – creating both an unfairness and a perverse 
incentive to leave.
19
 Or, government would be prevented from enforcing repayment on anyone (due 
to this being ‘coercive’) and the scheme would collapse. Again, it is unclear how this advances justice 
or fairness under liberalism or many other normative positions. 
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 See also Kapur and McHale (2005, 83-84). 
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 This position therefore supports various of Brock’s ripostes (Brock 2015, 245, 255) .  
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 Brock (2015, 245) makes a similar point in relation to taxation. 
The issue of investment cannot be understated. It is not only individuals who are borrowing against 
their future returns, but governments that borrow against future economic growth. From a public 
finance perspective it is optimal for governments to accumulate debt if it is done in order to engage 
in productive investment, whether in physical or human capital. To the extent that skilled emigration 
significantly reduces the return to such borrowing, it may even undermine the fiscal stability of 
developing countries.
20
  
4.  CONCEPTUAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL CONCERNS 
Let me now turn to some conceptual and philosophical concerns: primarily in relation to arguments 
by Blake, but also some areas of agreement between Brock and Blake. 
Exit, movement and the neglected rights of the unskilled 
There is an obvious point that is not given sufficient priority in debates around brain drain: from the 
perspective of individual welfare the problem with emigration of (say) doctors is not in their 
absolute number but in their rate of migration relative to those who would benefit from their 
presence.
21
 This in turns brings into question the focus of many authors on the rights of skilled 
migrants, whilst neglecting the comparable right of unskilled migrants. Some economists have at 
least recognised this inconsistency (Clemens 2011) and the result has been to provoke the revelation 
of other economists’ views against an influx of unskilled migrants (Borjas 2015). While I may 
disagree with those views, I believe that their being explicitly stated constitutes progress.  
In the context of Blake’s arguments, I worry that a similar underlying normative position is concealed 
by the choice of ‘exit’ as a principle of liberalism rather than ‘movement’. Blake develops the 
proposition that individuals must be allowed to exit, but need not be allowed to enter . Although 
never explicitly stated, this happens to serve as justification for the existing stance of developed 
countries in implementing policies that ensure the proportion of unskilled migrants to skilled 
migrants is far from the comparable ratio in source countries.  
In order to justify a position in which it is legitimate for liberal states to refuse entry, Blake (2015 
197-203) uses two analogies: marriage and the suicide of Goerring. The former is intended to 
demonstrate that an individual may be legitimately refused a right to enter into a relationship with 
another party if that party does not consent (marriage). The latter is used to illustrate the claim that 
the legitimacy of a given outcome may depend on the legitimacy of a party in making a decision that 
yields that outcome. And hence that a liberal state is unjustified in preventing exit but not 
unjustified in preventing entry.  
These seem oblique and unconvincing foundations for the conclusion that: 
It is one thing, then, for me to be denied the right to leave because no other state will have me – and 
quite another for me to be denied the right to leave because my own state wants to continue its 
relationship with me (Blake 2015, 203) 
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 In raising this prospect I am not suggesting that the magnitude of the lost return is sufficient to have such a 
major effect, but if one accepts the existence of positive externalities from human capital investment then the 
direction of the effect seems quite certain. 
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 Gibson and McKenzie (2011, 114-116) argue that unskilled migration tends to be positively correlated with 
skilled migration. There’s is a weak result, however, since they find that the ration is about ‘one-to-one’, which 
is clearly not the ratio in source countries. The statistical correlation itself is largely uninteresting.  
 It is not hard to come-up with at-least-as-plausible an example as the marriage analogy against the 
free right to exit. Consider two individuals flying an experimental bi-plane. Each is required in order 
to balance the aircraft. If either exits, with or without their parachute, the plane will spiral out of 
control and kill the remaining party. It seems legitimate under such circumstances for one party to 
prevent the other from leaving without due cause, even if there was never any formal contract to 
that effect. But I would not proffer this as an argument against the general liberal right of individuals 
to exit from situations in which they no longer wish to be present.  
Given the effect of highly selective migration policies of developed countries on brain drain, the 
issue of entry is clearly fundamental. If unskilled citizens of developing countries could migrate as 
freely as their skilled counterparts, brain drain – as defined relative to country populations – 
becomes irrelevant by definition. It would therefore be valuable to see a full development of the 
case for denial of exit as illiberal, but the denial of entry as consistent with liberal principles. In the 
present context, such a justification would have to explain how selective entry can be justified in the 
face of what Blake considers to be conditions under which source countries lack legitimacy.  
Rawlsian or util itarian? 
A second critical point relates to Blake’s association of his position with a Rawlsian view (Blake 2015, 
204-207). This is based on a starting point of Rawls’ analysis in his Theory of Justice that 
utilitarianism may lead to the infringement of basic liberties, particularly those of the worst off in 
society. I suggest that Blake’s reading of Rawls for the purposes of the brain drain debate is 
interesting but anachronous. 
A welfare economics-inspired reading of Rawls, which is fairly mainstream in the economics 
literature, would begin by identifying the distribution of welfare in a society. It is surely not 
controversial to argue that those who are skilled and with the prospect of migration are almost 
always better off in terms of general welfare than those who are unskilled and deprived of the 
option of migration. Using a Rawlsian social welfare function to assess the merits of brain drain 
would look first at the effect on the worst off. At this point the empirical disagreements of preceding 
sections become relevant. But let us accept for argument’s sake that skilled emigration hurt the 
worst off in developing societies (as I believe it does). Then it follows that this would not be 
desirable from a Rawlsian perspective. It seems strange, then, to privilege the background to Rawls’ 
theory in order to contradict the outcome of applying the theory, and thereby favour the most 
privileged in developing country societies. 
A second approach follows quite naturally: we could ask what the hypothetical developing country 
citizen would choose behind the veil of ignorance. Would they choose unimpeded emigration rights 
for beneficiaries of government higher education subsidies, or would they choose constraints on 
migration? There are philosophical and empirical aspects to this and I do not claim to have a 
definitive answer. Nevertheless, it seems clear that core aspects of Rawls’ theory may support the 
view that skilled migration should be constrained. 
Notice that these two approaches relate to application of Rawlsian principles within a given 
developing country. This is important given Rawls’s disavowal (Rawls 1999) of the application of such 
principles to global justice. My own position on that particular issue aligns more with those, such as 
Pogge (1988), who argue that limiting the application of Rawls’s earlier arguments in this way is 
illegitimate. It would therefore be legitimate to ask the above question to a ‘global citizen’. 
Nevertheless, this remains a matter of significant debate in the literature. 
A final point supporting scepticism of an association between Rawlsian principles and opposing 
barriers to skilled migration was already hinted at in preceding analysis: most economic studies 
favouring skilled emigration do so on the basis of a simple arithmetic addition of benefits and 
subtraction of costs. Specifically, the gains to emigrants are compared to the losses of those who 
remain. This is clearly a simplistic form of utilitarianism in the sense that the costs to the worst-off 
citizens are given no greater weight than the benefits to the best-off. One could argue – now 
completely in contrast to Blake – that it is precisely the potential harm of such calculations that 
Rawls had in mind when he devised his theory. Because under such approaches, provided the gross 
salary gain to migrants exceeds the pecuniary welfare losses to non-migrants, migration is justified 
regardless of whether or not it confines some people to a life of wretchedness. 
22
 
What status has the nation-state? 
The preceding analysis may suggest that I would favour compensation mechanisms by which 
developed countries compensate developing countries (in some way) for the losses they suffer. 
Although in principle I agree that this would be an improvement on the current situation, one 
concern does arise. The literature does not appear to give adequate consideration to the 
philosophical status of the nation state.  
The relevance of this issue follows from the dynamic that arises in a situation where developing 
countries become merely producers of skills to be exported elsewhere. Eventually, assuming the 
dynamic continues unimpeded, these countries will become eviscerated as nation-states. Their 
ultimate objective effectively becomes to export all their citizens and then cease to exist. While I 
cannot in the present paper defend a strong stance on the merits or demerits of this, it does seem 
significant that the endorsement of compensation over restriction implies such an outcome in the 
limit.  
It follows that to the extent nation-states have value, we will want to ensure their development and 
stability and for that purpose compensation for brain drain is an unsatisfactorily weak response. 
Limitations on emigration may be necessary to build the institutions that create and sustain 
legitimate nation-states.  
In this regard, another issue that is largely neglected in much of the literature is the broader political 
economy of skilled migration. For instance, do the increased returns to capital in developed 
countries mean that developed country governments are the subject of lobbying by firms to 
implement policies to allow, or attract, skilled migrants. How are those benefits distributed within 
recipient countries? And to what extent do power asymmetries between developed and developing 
countries actually allow for more vigorous efforts by the latter to prevent or mitigate any harms?   
To the extent that the existence and success of existing nation states constitutes a good in itself, the 
cost of brain drain is higher and certain remedies become less appealing. Political economy 
considerations, by contrast, are pertinent to the development of pragmatic solutions. Both would be 
fruitful areas for further research and analysis. 
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 One way around this third point might be to argue that emigrants are no longer members of the same 
society as those who remain and therefore — given Rawls’s arguments against application of his principles 
across states — the criticism does not bind. I would argue, however, that this begs the question. 
Source and recipient 
The contributions in Brock and Blake (2015) uniformly refer to source and recipient countries. In 
practice, there are a significant number of developing countries that are both sources of skilled 
migrants and recipients. Kapur and McHale make this point strongly: 
The most significant challenge for public policy lies with the many medium-sized countries of the 
world. While their populations are large enough to sustain self-replicating human capital, their 
current human capital capabilities are “thin.” Out-migration can further deplete this already weak 
pool and trigger a downward spiral as [those remaining behind] also try to move out. If weak 
institutions are the central cause of state failure and human capital is critical to institutional 
strength, the global externalities of skilled out-migration may be quite worrisome. (Kapur and 
McHale 2005, 179) 
South Africa is a good example.
23
 South Africa migration policy was at one stage partly premised on a 
resistance to ‘beggar they neighbour’ dynamics. The intention was to rather engage with developed 
countries to prevent the ‘poaching’ of skilled workers, rather than simply substitute them by taking 
comparably qualified individuals from poorer developing countries. In practice, though, South Africa 
appears to have increasingly yielded to the latter temptation in the face of a failure to stem the 
outflow of its own skilled citizens. At the same time, it does appear to have implemented some 
compensating mechanisms. A notable example is that students from the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) now pay local student rates at universities and therefore are 
effectively subsidised by the South African government.  
Such examples caution against neatly categorising states into ‘senders’ and ‘receivers’. Ultimately, it 
is likely to be the net effect of inflows and outflows of skilled migrants in a given period of time that 
determine the welfare effects on residents. In saying this, though, we must be careful not to conflate 
numbers of skilled migrants with the ‘quality’ of migrants (in terms of skill, potential contribution to 
society and so on).  
The nature of selection dynamics is such that it would be appropriate, ex ante, to assume that the 
highest-skilled migrants choose to go to those countries where they get the highest returns to their 
skills. Docquier and Rapoport (2012, 250-253) refer to this as “the screening-selection channel”. For 
example, on average the Zambian software engineer who emigrates to the United States is likely to 
be more skilled than the Kenyan software engineer who emigrates to Zambia.
24
 And it would 
therefore be incorrect to assume that because Zambia has sent and received a software engineer 
that the net brain drain is zero.  
A further consideration, which is very relevant for institution-building but almost impossible to 
quantify, is that the loss of relevant local knowledge may be very hard to compensate for.
25
 
Incidentally: the importance of local knowledge militates against solutions (Brock 2015, 95) in which 
developed countries send their citizens to compensate for brain drain. 
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 See for instance the overview by Crush (2011) for the Southern African Migration Programme. 
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 This analysis makes the simplifying, but not unproblematic, assumption that individuals have no attachment 
to particular countries. The Kenyan software engineer may in fact have had the option of going to the USA but 
moved to Zambia because he married a Zambian. The Zambian may have gone to the USA because she had 
family there who could facilitate her migration. And so forth. 
25
 Not to mention that such measures, including Bhagwati’s ‘Gray Peace Corps’ (Bhagwati 2009, 8) would 
generate legitimate concerns about neo-colonialism. 
The implications of the above for the empirical literature are not immediately clear. The failure of 
that literature to account for net flows might suggest that the scale of brain drain for developing 
countries might be overstated. But that does not follow. To illustrate, consider one common 
approach: examining skilled migration to OECD countries (Docquier and Rapoport 2012). This could, 
potentially, overstate the brain drain for a country like South Africa, which receives many skilled 
migrants from other African countries. But it could understate the brain drain for those African 
countries whose skilled migrants substitute for South Africa’s own emigrants.
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The data on skilled migration currently available typically lacks sufficient detail to account for either 
of the above factors. Nevertheless, future research will need to examine the sensitivity of empirical 
findings to these considerations. 
Reflexivity 
Implicit in much of the above analysis is the sense that researchers and authors on the brain drain 
are significantly influenced by prior, normative positions on the matters at hand. Although a more 
thorough study is warranted, it may be notable that a significant number of the authors cited who 
critique the idea that brain drain is harmful (Clemens from Turkey, Nyarko from Ghana and 
McKenzie from New Zealand) are themselves skilled emigrants from countries with lower per capita 
GDP than their destination country. Similarly, the author of this paper, which argues that brain drain 
is likely to be harmful and can legitimately be subject to greater restrictions, emigrated to obtain 
further education and then returned to a developing country.  
There is nothing deterministic about these backgrounds. Bhagwati was a skilled emigrant but argued 
for a tax on individuals like himself. Borjas is a skilled emigrant but argues that excessive emigration 
to developed countries can harm their citizens. Admittedly, we are – by definition – never likely to 
read the thoughts of uneducated citizens of developing countries in academic papers, and this 
creates a special distortion of its own. 
Nevertheless, a reading of much of the literature suggests that the topic of brain drain is both 
emotive and divisive, and individuals’ priors do play a significant role in determining their null 
hypotheses.
27
 In the context of empirical work in economics, where data is unsatisfactory and model 
specifications malleable, this may be particularly problematic. 
5.  TOO IGNORANT TO ACT? 
With the caveat of my own potential biases in mind, I return to the question that arose in preceding 
sections. I had argued that the findings of econometric analysis on brain drain suffer from a number 
of flaws that bring into question their reliability. In conceding some such limitations, certain 
economists (Clemens 2011) nevertheless argue that much more needs to be known before any 
action to stem such migration can be justified. Blake expresses a similar position: in light of the 
philosophical concerns raised, a lack of definitive empirical evidence should make us wary of 
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 As Docquier and Rapoport (2012, 220-221) note, the exclusion of Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, from the 
group of beneficiary countries could also lead to underestimates of the numerical extent of brain drain. For 
instance, a significant proportion of emigration by South African nurses is to Saudi Arabia (Breier, Wildschut 
and Mgqolozana 2009),  
27
 As one example, in arguing against taxes and quotas on emigration Clemens (2014) takes exception to the 
term ‘brain drain’: “Calling the rate of skilled worker movement the ‘brain drain rate’ is just as value-laden as 
calling female labor force participation the ‘family abandonment rate’” (Clemens 2014, 36). 
infringing upon liberties. Should lack of definitive knowledge preclude decisive action? I think not. 
We are not entirely ignorant. 
To start, we know that skilled migration from developing to developed countries is a quantitatively 
significant phenomenon. Furthermore, we know that globally, economic activity is becoming 
increasingly skills- and knowledge-intensive. In addition, it is undisputed that many developed 
country governments seek to attract skilled migrants because of the benefits they are believed to 
confer on the recipient country. And, historically, no country has succeeded in obtaining per capita 
income levels of developed countries, and sustaining those, without also raising human capital to 
comparative degree.   
The appropriate null hypothesis, therefore, continues to be that brain drain is harmful to the 
development prospects of developing countries and the welfare of citizens who remain. It is also 
beneficial to developed countries in a variety of ways. The claim that we must remain agnostic about 
brain drain because of the current methodological limitations of applied economics does not stand-
up to logical scrutiny. The argument that brain drain is beneficial to developing countries may be the 
only instance in which economists have attempted to argue that losing a valuable resource without 
compensation is a good thing. In that regard, and with a Rawlsian perspective in mind, it would be 
distasteful if a defense of a dynamic that plausibly harms the most vulnerable peoples globally 
(unskilled developing country citizens) was hung on a supposed appeal to the rights of the 
vulnerable (skilled developing country migrants). 
In the preceding, detailed analysis of particular arguments in the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic literature I noted two uncertainties. First, we are econometrically uncertain whether 
there is a positive effect of emigration on the human capital investment of those remaining. Second, 
we are econometrically uncertain whether skills and education of citizens positively affect economic 
growth. I suggest these uncertainties are not equivalent, and the existing economic literature is 
mistaken in treating them as such. There are ample forms of other evidence that skills — broadly 
defined — matter for growth, institutions and the well-being of other citizens. On the other hand, 
the supposed effect of prospective emigration on human capital investment arises as a ‘theoretical 
curiousity’ with little in the way of even anecdotal evidence for support. 
There are many important questions in social science that we will not be able to answer definitively 
for some time, if ever. This requires a certain degree of modesty if social scientists are not to stray 
too far along the spectrum of practice towards pseudoscience. At the same time, not everything 
should be mystified to the point where we are paralysed to act in the face of injustice. In this 
instance I would suggest, in agreement with Brock (2015), that neither the economic nor 
philosophical arguments against reasonable actions are persuasive. 
6.  WHAT ACTIONS TO TAKE? 
Assuming the reader is carried by the above arguments, what actions might be appropriate? This is a 
difficult question, for a number of reasons.  
First, it seems unlikely that any reasonable intervention – one that is not unquestionably 
authoritarian – will make a significant difference in the absence of active cooperation by developed 
countries. In fact, I would argue that to achieve a given effect: the coerciveness of policies to 
counteract, or offset, the negative effects of skilled migration necessarily rises in proportion to the 
lack of cooperation by developed countries. The absence of such cooperation may, furthermore, 
render interventions counterproductive, by causing emigrants to completely and permanently sever 
ties with their home countries.  
Second, there appears to have been little investigation of the efficacy of those measures that have 
been adopted by some countries; as a consequence, empirical evidence is scarce.  
Finally, given the complexity of the issues, limited data and weak empirical evidence, it is my view 
that economic theory is unlikely to provide much useful guidance for policy. 
Given the above, any proposals are necessarily somewhat speculative. With that important caveat in 
mind, let me briefly sketch some proposals along a spectrum of different degrees of international 
cooperation: from an ‘ideal’ situation of full international cooperation, to the ‘status quo’ situation 
in which developed countries remain largely self-interested and uncooperative. In doing so, I also 
note some possible unintended consequences. 
In a situation of full international cooperation, there are two quite different options available that 
may yield similar outcomes. The ‘coercive’ option is one in which developed countries simply refuse 
to admit skilled migrants from developing countries – in the same way they currently refuse entry to 
many unskilled migrants. The ‘liberal’ alternative, which serves to align states’ incentives, would be 
to require that states receiving skilled migrants also accept unskilled migrants in proportion to the 
ratio in existence in the country of origin. While this second option does not resolve matters relating 
to institution building and the value of nation states, it arguably addresses most other harms. 
Furthermore, it would be consistent with a theory of liberalism that treats freedom of movement as 
the key liberal principle, rather than the proposal by Blake to emphasise exit (while treating entry 
differently). 
An intermediate scenario is one in which brain drain continues – due to skilled migrants still being 
allowed entry – but there is cooperation among states in offsetting its effects. In that instance, 
developed countries would not actively encourage (as opposed to merely permit) such migration. 
The first priority for developing countries in this scenario is offsetting the negative effects on public 
finances. Strict conditions on state-funded study abroad programmes would be enforceable and 
ensure that citizens whose foreign study is sponsored do return to their countries of origin (at least 
for a period of time). Similarly, any citizen emigrating who has benefited from state-sponsored, or 
subsidised, education should be required to pay back the full present value of the subsidy – either on 
emigration, or over a period of time. As I have already argued, I believe that not only are such 
measures legitimate, but that it would be fiscally irresponsible of any government not to make an 
effort to recoup these costs.  
There are, furthermore, other fiscal costs that are likely to be experienced; notably, lost tax revenue 
from relatively high-earning skilled workers. Desai, et al. (2009) make some progress in outlining 
how such fiscal losses might be calculated. Given how obvious a channel this is for potential harm, it 
is disturbing that the authors refer to it as a “hirtherto unexamined effect of international human 
capital flows” (Desai, et al. 2009, 43).  The issue that arises is how such costs might be recouped. The 
most obvious option would be a variant on the ‘Bhagwati Tax’, by which a proportion of the income 
earned by skilled migrants is paid to their countries of origin. 
It is important to note that Bhagwati’s (1976) famous proposal was made partially with reference to 
direct losses from skilled migration, but he did not discuss fiscal harms per se. Instead, much of his 
argument rests on going a step further to suggest: “extension of the principle of progressive taxation 
to a country's population across national boundaries” (Bhagwati 1976, 35). In short, Bhagwati argues 
that it would be fair if some of the surplus accruing to, or as a result of, migrants is returned to their 
countries of origin regardless of whether such migration had caused harm. What is unclear is the 
proportion of the surplus that would be appropriate. 
One way of thinking about this is in terms of game theoretic models of bargaining. From that 
perspective, it is hardly surprising that at present little, if any, of the surplus is returned as a matter 
of obligation: the bargaining power of developed countries and skilled migrants far exceeds that of 
developing countries or their poorest citizens.
28
 
Once again, some caution is appropriate. If a tax is levied over-and-above taxes that such individuals 
pay anyway, this creates an incentive to renounce citizenship and pay nothing. Furthermore, it could 
‘crowd out’ (discourage) remittances. In various respects, it would seem more satisfactory (as 
argued by Brock, Blake and Bhagwati) if developed country governments paid such a tax. But that is 
dependent on levels of cooperation that currently seem unlikely.   
In an environment in which developed countries are entirely self-interested, many developing 
countries have few options. While various authors suggest that developing countries should take 
‘proactive’ measures to make staying more desirable for those with the option to leave, this appears 
to beg the question. Brock’s discussion of institution-building identifies the key problem: how exactly 
are developing countries supposed to build their institutions, including improvement of working 
conditions on the public service, when many of their best and brightest leave? While I agree with 
Blake (2015 217-218) that some improvement may be possible in most countries at the margin, the 
issue is whether a large enough improvement can be made to prevent migration. Furthermore, the 
bargaining dynamics of such a process could simply mean that elites consume so much of the social 
surplus they generate that there is no net positive impact on the welfare of those without the ability 
to migrate.
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Two options do, however, bear mentioning. The first is the creative introduction of barriers to 
migration that are not explicitly coercive. One example, discussed in parts of the literature, is 
providing training in such a way that skills are still locally useful but not internationally transferable. 
In South Africa, for instance, one might train community healthcare workers solely in Zulu rather 
than train nurses in English.
30
 (Blake explicitly accepts such policies (Blake 2015, 218-219), though I 
have my doubts as to whether they are materially different from other forms of coercion he rejects).  
The other option that appears relatively unexplored is the role, and cultivation, of preferences for 
remaining that are sufficiently strong to overcome the lure of financial and other rewards from 
emigration. Given that such sentiments may be more often associated with nationalism, 
communalism or communitarianism, it is understandable that they receive little treatment in 
analyses premised on pared-down liberal philosophies. And it is an open question whether it is any 
more possible to cultivate such preferences, than it is to build institutions, while losing scarce 
resources. So too whether it is possible to do so without generating undesirable forms of 
nationalism. 
As a final point, I would argue that where any of the ‘coercive’ measures described above are 
implemented, it is highly desirable that the moral and ethical principles underlying such efforts be 
made explicit. The growing literature on behavioural responses to taxation appears to suggest 
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 Indeed, if one was so inclined, various aspects of the brain drain problem could be considered from a game 
theoretic perspective on the social contract – of the kind discussed at length by Binmore (1994, 1998). 
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 Again, a simple economic model implies that if potential migrants are unconstrained their bargaining power 
will be such that they can demand as much surplus as is required to make them locally better off than they 
would be under migration. 
30
 I owe this example to a discussion with Mignonne Breier. 
(Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998, Cornelissen, Himmler and Koenig 2013, Pickhardt and Prinz 
2014) that individuals’ perceptions of fairness can have a significant effect on compliance. This is, of 
course, entirely consistent with the social contract approach to justice. Greater awareness of the 
harm and unfairness caused by excessive skilled migration from developing countries may therefore 
be an important practical step toward achieving greater local and global justice.  
A worthwhile point on which to conclude, then, is that academic debates on the subject, such as 
those in Brock and Blake (2015), may have material effects on the feasibility and success of policies 
merely through citizens’ perceptions of what is just and equitable. The preceding critique of the 
empirical economics literature similarly implies that the current predilection in that literature to 
portray brain drain as beneficial could substantially undermine any efforts to curb harms. It is ironic 
that contributions in the philosophy and economics literatures explicitly premised on liberal 
foundations could be responsible for undermining solutions – such as completely free movement of 
labour and international agreements to mitigate harms – that are most compatible with liberalism.   
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